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The paper studies product bundling in a duopoly supply chain network under the influence of 
different power-balance structures, bundling decisions and advertising efforts on total supply 
chain profit. Mathematical models comprising two manufacturers and a single retailer are 
developed to capture the impact of bundling policy and advertisement strategy under three 
power-balance structures, namely Manufacturer Stackelberg, Retailer Stackelberg and Vertical 
Nash. Following game theory models and numerical examples, the study found that the total 
profit of the supply chain is undifferentiated under the manufacturer Stackelberg and Vertical 
Nash case in the manufacturer bundling and retailer bundling strategies. However, total supply 
chain profit under manufacturer bundling strongly dominates under retailer bundling in Retailer 
Stackelberg and Vertical Nash, and remains valid under multiple settings of market size, price 
elasticity and advertising elasticity. It is also found that manufacturer bundling is significantly 
affected by advertising effort compared to retailer bundling. The study contributes to the 
literature interfacing supply chain and marketing by studying bundling policy and advertising 
strategy simultaneously for homogenous products, under various power-balance structures and 
price competition.  
 




Bundling is a popular strategy adopted in marketing, which combines two or more products or 
services to maximise the chain’s profit (Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999; Stremersch and Tellis, 
2002; Lancioni et al., 2005), though the pricing and advertising of these bundles remains an 
extremely challenging task. A bundle can consist of a group of complementary products (e.g., 
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shampoo and conditioner; pizza and toppings), vertically differentiated products (e.g., DVD 
and Blu-ray disk bundle), independently valued products (e.g., coffee with teacup) or substitute 
products (e.g., two-ticket combination to a successive football match). They can also be made 
of multiple units of the same products. Bundling can involve product bundling or price 
bundling (Beheshtian-Ardakani et al., 2018). Product bundling defines integrated products that 
provides extra value to the customers and price bundling consists of a package sold at a discount 
rate, without any integration of the goods and/or services involved (Adomavicius et al., 2015; 
Giri et al., 2017; Vamosiu, 2018). In addition, depending on the number of items bundled, the 
nature of such items and the degree of variations, bundling can also reduce consumer costs 
(Yan et al., 2014).  
Product bundling offers economic scale as bundle choices and size are significant for 
both buyer and seller. Typically, three types of product bundling strategies are employed by 
firms: component strategy, where the retailer or manufacturer offers only the component-wise 
product; pure bundling strategy, where the retailer/manufacturer sells the product in a bundle, 
for instance, the television content provider Videocon typically offers its television subscribers 
free additional access (regional channel) on any devices; and a mixed strategy where the seller 
offers component as well as bundle products, for example, the selling of hardcover and Kindle 
editions of books on Amazon independently as well as bundles of hardcover and Kindle 
editions together (Meyer and Shankar, 2016; Ma and Mallik, 2017). Amazon's bundle of 
hardcover and Kindle edition of any book is an example of a retail-produced bundle. When a 
manufacturer adopts an appropriate bundling approach, it is essential to adjust their sales 
strategy in response to the bundling. However, in today's competitive business environment, it 
is typical that a retailer will try to sell bundled products produced by two or more manufacturers 
to attract more demand (Yan et al., 2014). Therefore, in order to maximise its selling, the firm 
involves an advertising campaign to promote the bundling products.  
Advertising helps to promote the characteristics of the bundle product quality, attractive 
price, discount and other promotions to encourage consumers to buy. Furthermore, most studies 
discuss that advertising plays a vital role in demand creation and market expansion (Mesak and 
Darrat, 1993; Liu et al., 2014; Chakraborty et al., 2018). The seller uses advertising to create 
awareness about the product, thereby increasing product sales and profit. Almost every 
company keeps a significant portion of its total budget for advertising (Yenipazarli, 2015; Jena 
et al., 2017). According to He et al. (2011), in 2007, manufacturers spent over $25 billion on 
advertising, compared to $5 billion in 2000. However, it is also crucial for a seller to decide 
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the optimal price and advertising effort of a bundle product, for maximising the sales revenue 
in a supply chain network. Merely selling high quality products is not sufficient in the current 
competitive business environment; thus, multiple marketing strategies are adopted by 
businesses to increase their profitability. Due to the potential impact of such strategies on 
product price and demand, competition between manufacturers and retailers on bundling price 
and advertising effort is significantly affected.  
Most studies, to date, focus on various models of bundling in supply chain management 
(e.g., Arora, 2008; Cataldo and Ferrer, 2017; Giri et al., 2017; Vamosiu, 2018; Lin et al., 2020); 
though very limited studies have addressed bundling price policy in the supply chain under 
competition (Chakravarty, Mild and Taude, 2013; Ma and Mallik, 2017; Vamosiu, 2018). For 
instance, Yan et al. (2014) discuss the bundling pricing policy under a single manufacturer and 
retailer. Meanwhile, Mild and Taude (2017), studying the bundling of vertically differentiated 
products in a supply chain, analysed the equilibrium outcomes under the manufacturer bundling 
and retailer bundling. In addition, Vamosis (2018) analysed a two-product supplier’s incentives 
to bundle their products considering pure bundling, mixed bundling and independent bundling 
under imperfect competition against one of their products. None of these works consider the 
impact of the advertisement element while considering manufacturer bundling and retailer 
bundling under dual supply chain competition. Simultaneous consideration of product bundling 
and advertising efforts on internal supply chain competition is distinctly lacking in the 
academic literature. Therefore, the study proposes to develop an analytical model to optimise 
total supply chain profit by studying product bundling and advertising strategy in a duopoly 
competitive supply chain environment. More importantly, the study addresses the effect of the 
power balance between two manufacturers and a retailer on optimal product prices, advertising 
costs and total supply chain profit. 
This paper considers three power-balance structures/scenarios under product bundling 
and advertising strategy between two manufacturers and a retailer in the supply chain network. 
There are three possible power-balance structures/scenarios concerning strategic interactions 
between a manufacturer and a retailer, namely: (1) Manufacturer Stackelberg, (2) Retailer 
Stackelberg, and (3) Vertical Nash (Lu et al., 2011). In general, manufacturers possess more 
bargaining power than retailers in a market (Ailawadi, 1995; Ma et al., 2019), where each 
manufacturer chooses the wholesale price using the response function of the retailer and by 
considering the observed wholesale price of the competitors' product. Such interactions 
between supply-chain partners will follow a Manufacturer Stackelberg. On the other hand, in 
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a Retailer Stackelberg, the retailer possesses more negotiating power due to its dominating size 
or customer loyalty in the supply chain network. In Vertical Nash, neither the manufacturer nor 
the retailer possesses a larger bargaining power in the negotiation. In this paper, two strategies 
for the production of a bundle are considered: manufacturer bundling, where a manufacturer 
produces the bundle; and, retailer bundling, where the manufacturer produces individual 
products and then retailer produces the bundle from such products.  
The paper seeks to address the following research questions: 
(1) What is the optimal bundling price and advertising expenditure under three strategic 
power-balance structures between manufacturers and retailer? 
(2) How does the price competition and advertising expenditure influence the total supply 
chain profit under retail bundling and manufacturer bundling?  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. A brief review of the literature is covered 
in Section 2. Section 3 discusses key notations and assumptions of the modelling framework. 
Comparison of the results is presented in Section 4, followed by a numerical example to 
illustrate the working of the model in Section 5. Section 6 discusses sensitivity analysis and 
managerial insights. The paper concludes with a discussion on key findings, contribution and 
future research directions. 
 
2. Literature review 
This section provides a brief review on key concepts (bundling, competition and advertisement) 
interfacing with marketing and supply chain literature. 
2.1. Bundling in marketing and supply chain  
Marketing and supply chain management literature around bundling mainly considers a single 
firm in vertical and horizontal supply chains. Hanson and Martin (1990) developed an 
optimisation model for the single firm bundle pricing problem. For simplicity, it would be 
useful to allow the marginal cost of a bundle product.  Bakos and Bryjolfsson (2000) studied 
the bundling schemes of information goods and found that large bundles may bring significant 
advantage in the competition for upstream content. McCardle et al. (2007) explored the effect 
of bundling on channel profit, considering two standard retail products (basic and fashion) and 
observed that bundling on profitability relies on individual product demand. Pan and Honhon 
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(2012), exploring the optimal bundling and pricing strategy for a firm selling vertically 
differentiated products, discovered the conditions under which a pure bundling and mixed 
bundling strategy are optimal. Meanwhile, Li et al. (2013) addressed the bundling sale 
considering customer heterogeneity and found that mixed partial bundling schemes are superior 
when compared with the component strategy for information goods.  
Girju et al. (2013), while identifying the effect of channel interaction on the supply 
chain members’ bundling decision, found that the pure component strategy is the best strategy 
in most cases. Cao et al. (2015), addressing the retail bundling strategy in a distribution channel, 
observed that the manufacturer's marginal production plays an important role in channel profit 
considering retailers’ bundling decisions. Prasad et al. (2015), addressing the impact of mixed 
bundling strategy against reserved product pricing, found that reserved product pricing 
profitability depends on the fraction of myopic consumers. Ma and Mallik (2017) studied 
bundling of vertically differentiated products in a supply chain, considering a single 
manufacturer and a single retailer under retailer bundling and manufacturer bundling strategies. 
They found that total supply chain profit under manufacturer bundling dominates retail 
bundling. Using mixed-integer nonlinear programming, Cataldo and Ferrer (2017) analysed a 
problem faced by a firm in a single market segment to determine the optimal composition and 
pricing of multiple bundles.  
Pure bundling and mixed bundling strategies are better than component strategy 
according to Xu et al. (2018), who addressed the firm's optimal pricing and quality policy under 
three bundling strategies (i.e., no bundling, pure bundling and mixed bundling). Their results 
show that pure bundling proves more profitable compared to any other strategy. Hence, in this 
paper, we consider pure bundling in a supply chain to identify how optimal bundling price and 
supply chain network/channel profit are affected by price competition. Hurkens et al. (2019) 
discuss how bundling affects price competition by considering an asymmetric duopoly, where 
one firm has symmetric dominance in all of its products. They found that dominant firms 
benefit from a positive demand size effect of bundling. Taleizadeh et al. (2019) studied supply 
chain optimisation considering two pricing strategies such as pricing of complementary 
products without a bundling policy, and pricing of complementary products under a bundling 
policy. In the bundling policy, the wholesale and retail prices are lower than the prices without 
bundling.  
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Zhang et al., (2019) analysed the return and refund policy for product and core service 
bundling, considering two-stage demand uncertainty under a dual supply chain. Consumers can 
decide to return the default profit through a direct channel. Meanwhile, Liu et al. (2020) studied 
a two-stage supply chain consisting of two manufacturers and one retailer, while considering 
imperfect, complementary products. More recently, Heydari et al. (2020) discussed 
coordinated and non-monetary sales promotion in a supply chain, considering the buy one get 
one free (BOGO) scheme. They found that a coordinated BOGO scheme provides higher 
supply chain profitability and demand.  
Furthermore, Zhou et al. (2020) evaluated the impact of bundling and pricing strategies 
of two competing firms under a multi-stage game theoretic model. Here, one firm acts as a 
leader to determine the product price, before the other firm acts as a follower. In addition, they 
consider that one firm offers the bundle product, while the other firm offers separate products 
under an equilibrium system.  
2.2. Competition in supply chains  
There is a vast amount of literature on competition between different supply chain networks; 
however, the focus of this paper is on competition within supply chain partners. Interestingly, 
most of the existing literature discusses chain competition, considering inventory theory and 
product availability (Mahajan and VanRyzin 2001). Earlier work by Choi (1991) shows that 
all the members in the supply chain, including customers, are better off when there is no single 
dominating player in the supply chain network. Choi (1996), extended the work by considering 
the effect of price competition and advertisement simultaneously on bundling decision, finding 
that most consumer goods are retail-dominated in a chain.  
Meanwhile, Chen (1997) studied the practice of product bundling; in this case, author 
developed equilibrium theory of product bundling, considering perfect competition under a 
product-differentiation device. Furthermore, Opornsawad (2013) addressed the pricing 
competition strategy for a commoditised product such as drinking water and generic 
pharmaceutical products under different bargaining power scenarios. Their model considers a 
duopoly manufacturer and a common retailer for analysing the impact of power balance 
between manufacturer and retailer under a competitive environment. Roy et al. (2015) studied 
a two-echelon supply chain considering duopoly retailers and a common manufacturer under 
price-sensitive demand with random arrival of customers. They also compared different 
Stackelberg models, such as Bertrand and Cournot, for maximising the profit of the players in 
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the chain. It is observed that competition between original equipment manufacturers can be 
better off cooperating as supply chain partners (Pun, 2015).  
Zhou (2017) proposed a framework for studying pure bundling considering consumer 
valuation under an oligopoly market. The model suggests how consumer valuation dispersion 
affects price competition. Meanwhile, Ali et al. (2018) studied the effect of potential market 
demand disruption on price and service level for competing retailers considering a 
Manufacturer Stackelberg game model. They analysed the effect of demand disruption under 
centralised and decentralised scenarios and found that price and service level investment are 
significantly influenced by demand disruption. Recently, Vamosiu (2018) examined bundling 
strategy, considering two product sellers of a differentiated product under imperfect 
competition and found that pure bundling emerges as the optimal pricing strategy and 
competitors maximise their profit under a mixed bundling strategy.  
2.3. Advertising in supply chains 
Earlier works on bundling advertisements explored the relationship between the traditional 
practice of bundling advertisements and content provision on the internet (Yuan et al., 1998). 
Koschat and Putsis (2002) studied audience characteristics and bundling considering the 
hedonic analysis of magazine and advertising strategy. Huang et al. (2002) addressed an 
interesting cooperative advertising model using a game theory approach, where the 
manufacturer paid for the brand name investment and shared some proportion of the local 
advertising cost incurred by the retailer. Yue et al. (2006) studied cooperative advertising in a 
manufacturer-retailer supply chain considering price deduction by the manufacturer to the 
customer. Bundling with advertising provides higher performance than bundling without 
advertising, as evidenced by Yan et al. (2014) who studied the value of the bundling strategy 
with advertising for identical and complementary products.  
The simultaneous consideration of bundling policy, advertising strategies and 
competition in a supply chain has not been explored in the extant literature. The closest possible 
work, previously attempted is by Vamosiu (2018), which explores optimal bundling under 
imperfect competition; however, this does not attempt a product bundling policy under various 
power balances between the manufacturer and retailer. Moreover, Cao and Ke (2018) studied 
cooperative advertising considering a single manufacturer and retailer under cost sharing.   
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2.4. Research gaps  
As observed in the above literature, none of these studies have discussed the effect of price 
competition and advertising expenditure on the optimal bundling price and total supply chain 
profit under three strategic power-balance structures between manufacturers and retailers. To 
fill this evident gap, in this paper, the power balance between two manufacturers and a retailer 
and its impact on optimal bundle product prices, advertising costs and total supply chain profit 
are examined under a competitive environment. However, some researchers have discussed the 
effect of competition on total supply chain profit considering the power balance between 
manufacturer and retailer. However, they did not consider the effect of different power balances 
between manufacturers and retailers on total profit under pure bundling strategies.  
The research discussed in this paper also differs from Ma and Mallik (2017), Xu et al. 
(2018), Giri et al. (2017), Yan et al. (2014) and Chakravarty (2013) by simultaneously 
considering the effect of advertising strategy and competition on bundling decisions under 
Manufacturer Stackelberg, Retailer Stackelberg, and Vertical Nash cases. Bundling with power 
balance between manufacturer and retailer under Manufacturer Stackelberg, Retailer 
Stackelberg, and Vertical Nash strategies, as such, has not been studied adequately in the 
supply chain and marketing literature. 
 
3. The model 
The model considers a competitive supply chain consisting of two manufacturers and single 
retailer (including other stakeholders in the network). Both of these manufacturers sell their 
products to a common retailer who, in turn, sells the products to the end customer. For 
modelling purposes, it is assumed that this activity occurs in a single period. The objective of 
the study is to make bundling decisions under price competition and advertising effort in a 
supply chain context. As a result, the developed model allows either the manufacturer or 
retailer to produce the bundle from two similar component products and compare the two 
scenarios. Here, it is assumed that the distance between each retailer is so large that there is no 
competition among retailers, thus allowing focus on competition between the two 
manufacturers. The model considers deterministic demand for each bundled product and is 
sensitive to two factors: (1) retail price; and, (2) advertising expenditure by the retailer. Note 
that only the advertising efforts by the retailer are considered. Here, pure bundling strategy 
with manufacturer bundling and retailer bundling is considered. 
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The assumption regarding the bargaining power possessed by each seller can influence 
how the pricing game is solved in this model. The bargaining power of the retailer and 
manufacturer can have a significant influence on supply chain profit. In this paper three forms 
of bargaining power within the supply chain are considered: 1) Manufacturer Stackelberg 
(MS), 2) Retailer Stackelberg (RS), and 3) Vertical Nash (VN). The level of bargaining power 
possessed by each player (as compared to the other firms) in the supply chain is interpreted by 
whether the manufacturer or retailer is the leader. The player with more bargaining power has 
the first-mover advantage (called Stackelberg leader), and the player with less bargaining 
power would have to respond to the leader's decision. Considering three power-balance 
scenarios in the model, the study attempts to explore the effect of bargaining power within the 
supply chain on the manufacturer and retailer bundling strategy.  
3.1. Model notations and assumptions  
Table 1 shows the notations used for the development of the mathematical model. The demand 
function is sensitive to price and advertising expenditure during mathematical modelling. 
Subscripts i, j, s, r, M and R, respectively, to indicate manufacturer 1, manufacturer 2, 
manufacturer, retailer, manufacturer bundling, and retailer bundling are used throughout paper. 
Table 1: Notation and associated description 
Symbol                                  Description 
              Demand of bundling product in the market, where    
 i	is	the	manufacturer1 
𝑐! Unit bundling cost of the bundling product 
              c1 and c2 Unit manufacturing cost of the components a and b. 
𝛼" Market size for the bundling product (𝛼! ) and individual product (𝛼# ) 
𝛽" Price elasticity 
𝛾" Cross- price elasticity 
              𝜃 Advertising effort (large positive number)  
           k Advertising sensitivity coefficient 
            Profit function of the retailer 
            Profit function of the manufacturer i 
 Decision variables 
              𝑝!# Unit selling price of a bundling product for the manufacturer i 
              𝑤!# Unit wholesale price of a bundling product for the manufacturer i  
	𝐴 Unit advertising cost for selling the bundling product.  
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An analytical model is formulated for the supply chain system, where component 
products are produced by the manufacturer and sold to the retailer under various power balance 
strategies between manufacturer and retailer. It is essential for the manufacturer to understand 
the effect of price competition of bundling on manufacturing activities. 
Assumption 1: Under retailer bundling, the manufacturer produces a component, and the 
retailer is responsible for producing the bundle. Whoever in the supply chain produces the 
bundle incurs the unit bundling cost 𝑐! ≥ 0 (Ma and Mallik, 2017). Here, the retailer is not 
selling any component products to the customer. Let “m” denote the retailer’s sales margin. 
The retail price can then be expressed as 𝑝!" = (𝑤#" +𝑤$") + 𝑚 for manufacturer i. Bundling 
consists of two component products whose whole sale price are 𝑤#" 	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑤$" for component a 
and b, respectively. Here, we have assumed that two components’ wholesale prices are equal, 
such as  𝑤#" = 𝑤$" = 𝑤". As a result, we can consider the retail price can be expressed as 
𝑝!" = 2	𝑤" +𝑚 and 𝑝!% = 2	𝑤% +𝑚 for manufacturer i and manufacturer j, respectively. 
 
Assumption 2: Under manufacturer bundling, the manufacturer produces bundling with a 
bundling price 𝑤!" 	(𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗), while the retailer sells these bundling products in 
component products into the market (Ma & Mallik, 2017; Yan et al., 2014). The bundling price 
is lower than the total price but higher than the component product price (Yan et al., 2014). 
Considering this assumption, here, the retail price can then be expressed as 𝑝" = 𝑤!" −𝑚 for 
manufacturer i (𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗).   
Assumption 3: The unit production cost (c1 and c2) of the two component products are 
normalized to zero (Yan et al., 2014; Ma and Malik,2017). 
The manufacturer produces two components and sells them to the retailer. To simplify 
the computation and the results, comparable to Banciu et al., (2010), Yan et al., (2014); Ma 
and Mallik (2017), and Xu et al., (2018), we assume that the unit production cost (c1 and c2) 
of the two component products are normalised to zero; we also assume that the wholesale price 
of the two component products is the same. The reason for this is that production costs of 
component products are not decision variables in our model, and the optimal result will not be 
affected.  This is a valid assumption for information goods and many of the examples discussed 
previously (e.g., CD, DVD, Blu-ray production where the fixed cost of content development 
significantly exceeds the variable cost of producing a disc). Whereas, in manufacturer 
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bundling, the manufacturer also produces the bundle from the component products and sells 
these products to the retailer at a unit wholesale price . For simplicity, the model considers 
that manufacturers only sell bundling products to the retailer. 
Assumption 4:  The demand structure is symmetric between two bundled products. Demand for 
a bundled product is decreasing by the manufacturer’s own retail price and increasing with 
the competitor's retail price. Furthermore, the demand for the bundled product is increasing 
by the retailer's advertising investment (Yan et al., 2014). Here, the paper considers bundled 
products exclusively under competition. 
  The demand function of the bundled product, produced by the manufacturer or retailer, 
is continuous, deterministic and price (and advertising effort) sensitive and assumed to be in 
the following form:	𝐷!# = ,𝛼$ − 𝛽"𝑝%& + 𝛾"	𝑝%' + 𝑘𝐴0. Where 𝛼& > 0, 𝛽' > 0, 𝛾𝑛 > 0, 𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑘 >
0, 𝑖 → manufacturer	1, j → manufacturer	2,
(	𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒, 𝑖𝑛	𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡	𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚	𝑤𝑒	𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑	𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗)	.	  
Here, to simplify the computation and results comparable to Yan et al., (2014), the market size  
(𝛼! ) of bundling product and individual product (𝛼# ) are equal (𝛼! = 𝛼" = 𝛼').  
Let 𝑝() and A be the selling price and advertising level, respectively. Subscript B is used to 
denote the bundling product throughout the paper.	𝛼() is the market base (i.e., potential demand 
offered free of charge). 𝛽'is the price elasticity of the product, whereas 𝛾" represents the cross-
price elasticity between two products. Parameter k measures the effect of expenditure 
advertising on bundle sales. The larger the value of k, the more efficient the effort of advertising 
in encouraging customers to purchase (Yan et al., 2014).  
In this model, the manufacturer can influence demand by setting the wholesale price 
for bundled products. On the other hand, the retailer can independently influence the selling 
price and advertising investment of each product. Each channel member in the supply chain 
expects to maximise his own profit, irrespective of the other. This leads to the following 
assumptions. 
Assumption 5: All members in the supply chain try to maximise their profit as if they have 
perfect information on the demand and cost structure of the other member (Jena & Sarmah 
,2014; Yan et al., 2014;). 
Assumption 6: Here, it is assumed that the cost of advertising effort by the retailer is  (for 
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Fixed payment A is spent by the retailer for advertising, who sells the bundled product and 
component products in the market. The cost of advertising level has a decreasing-return 
property. The advertising effort is usually modelled as a function of the investment in the 
product (Tsay & Agrawal, 2000; Yan et al., 2014). More effort by the retailer to sell bundle 
products from the market implies greater investment. Here,  is a positive number. The 
parameter θ measures the effect of the invested advertising on bundling sales. The larger the 
value of θ, the more efficient the invested advertising customer’s purchases. 
3.2. Manufacturer bundling  
Under manufacturer bundling, the manufacturer produces a bundling product from the two 
component products, a and b, and incurs the bundling cost 𝑐! . Here, the manufacturer decides 
the wholesale prices and makes advertisements for selling their bundle product. In the second 
stage, the retailer takes the manufacturer's wholesale price of the bundle product and then 
unbundles the product, sets the retail price of each of the component’s product (  for 
manufacturer i and  for manufacturer j, respectively) and, finally, sells these 
component products into the products. Here, we assume that the retailer sells the products of 
manufacturer i and manufacturer j with a price   and , 
respectively. Here, it is assumed that the retailer tries to sell the component products with a 
lower price compared to bundling the product; and that the total selling price of these two 
component products is higher than the single bundling product. In this case the retailer makes 
an effort, when advertising, to sell their component products to the retailer. The objective 
functions of the manufacturer and retailer under a pure bundling strategy are given as follows. 
(i, j=1,2, i≠j)                     (3.1) 
Subject to  
 
                                           
		𝜋𝑠𝑖
𝑀 = (𝑤𝐵𝑖 − 𝑐𝐵)𝐷𝐵𝑖                                                                                                              (3.2) 
𝜋.%
/ = (𝑤!% − 𝑐!)𝐷!%                                                                                                                (3.3)                                                                                                      
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Under the assumption, MS, the manufacturer takes the retailer's reaction function into the 
consideration of their respective price decisions. Here, retailer reaction function, given a 
wholesale price and , can be derived from the first-order condition of (3.1). 
                                                                                 (3.4) 
                                                                                  (3.5) 
Where i, j=1,2, i≠j. Since the objective function is concave in nature as , 
 and , it is solved by the first-order condition and the value of price 
and advertising effort are as follows: 
       (i, j=1,2, i≠j)                                                                 (3.6) 
                            (i, j=1,2, i≠j)                                                                    (3.7) 
Solving (3.6-3.7) simultaneously, one can determine the equilibrium value of  and  are 
as follows: 
                                                      (3.8)     
                                                                                      (3.9) 
It can be seen that the equilibrium of retail margin, advertising and demand of bundle 
product are a linear function of wholesale price by the manufacturer.  
                                                                             (3.10) 
Using the reaction function equations (3.8-3.9), the manufacturers’ equilibrium 
wholesale price can be derived following the first-order conditions of the respective 
manufacturers' profit maximisation problem (Eqn.(3.2).  
)
)*!"
𝜋+,(𝑚(𝑤!#), 𝑤!-) = 0,                                                                                                       (3.11) 
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Solving Eqns. (3.8, 3.9, 3.12, & 3.13) simultaneously, the optimal solution of 





























































                                                (3.18) 
Considering equations (3.14) -(3.18), the optimal demand function and total profit can be 
derived.  
𝐷" = (𝛼() − 𝛽B𝑝()
∗ + 𝛾𝑝(@





/∗                                                                                                   (3.19) 
3.2.2 Retailer-Stackelberg (RS) 
Here, in RS, the retailer becomes the leader and manufacturers the followers. This scenario 
arises in the market, where retailers’ size is large compared to their suppliers. For example, 
large retailers like Walmart and Costco can influence each product’s sales by lowering the 
price. Because of their large market sizes, the retailers can sustain their margin on sales, while 
holding profit from their manufacturers. In this market, the retailer takes the manufacturers’ 
reaction function into account for their own (retailer) price decisions. Here, the retailer problem 
is solved given that the retailer knows the manufacturers’ reactions towards their retail price. 
From equation (3.20), the optimal wholesale price of manufacturer i is defined as follows. 
* * * *
, , ,andBi Bj Aw mw
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/(𝑤!" , 𝑤!%|, 𝑝" , 𝑝% , 𝐴)                                                                                 (3.20)                                                              
Where i, j=1,2, i≠j. Since the objective function is concave in nature as , it is 
solved by the first-order condition and the value of wholesale price is as follows:  
0=                                    (3.21)                                 
We can discover the optimal value pf the wholesale price is as follows: 
,                                                   (i, j=1,2, i≠j)                        (3.22) 
Similarly, we can discover manufacturer 2. 
                                                    (i, j=1,2, i≠j)                 (3.23) 
Using the reaction function (eqn. 3.22 and 3.23), the retailer’s equilibrium retail price can be 
derived from the following first-order conditions of the respective retailer's profit maximisation 
problem in  ( eqn. 3.24).  
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Solving equations 3.22, 3.23,3.26, and 3.28, the optimal solution of , , , 
and A* can be determined. Finally, the demand quantise for manufacturer i can be determined 
as: 
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                                                                 (3.30) 
                                                (3.31) 
                                                (3.32) 
                                                                                       (3.33) 
Considering equations (3.29-3.33), we can derive the optimal value of demand and total profit 
is as follows: 
𝐷" = (𝛼!" − 𝛽B𝑝!"
∗ + 𝛾𝑝!%
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3.2.3 Vertical Nash (VN) 
The Vertical Nash (VN) model is studied as a benchmark to both the Manufacturer Stackelberg 
and Retailer Stackelberg cases. Here, each manufacturer has equal bargaining power and, thus, 
makes decisions simultaneously. This scenario arises in small to medium-sized manufacturers 
and retailers (Lu et al., 2011). In this case, a manufacturer does not dominate over the retailer. 
Thus, the manufacturer’s wholesale price decisions depend on the retailer’s selling price. 
Meanwhile, retailer price decisions are dependent on the wholesale price. The reaction 
functions of the retailer and manufacturer are derived in MS and RS respectively. From MS, 
the manufacturer reaction functions of m and A are given in equations (3.8) and (3.9), 
respectively while, in RS, the manufacturer’s reaction functions for 𝑤!" and 𝑤!" are given in 
equations (3.22) and (3.23), respectively. The optimal selling price, wholesale price and 
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                                  (i, j=1,2, i≠j)                      (3.38)   
Considering equations (3.35) to equations (3.38), the optimal demand function and total profit 
can be derived.  
𝐷" = (𝛼() − 𝛽B𝑝()
∗ + 𝛾𝑝(@
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3.3. Retailer bundling  
Under retail bundling, it is considered that the manufacturer produces only two component 
products, while the retailer produces the bundle from the component products and incurs the 
unit bundling cost	𝑐!. Here, it is considered that the wholesale price of two components (a and 
b) are the same	𝑤#" = 𝑤$" = 𝑤" for a manufacturer.  
,    (i, j=1,2, i≠j)                                (3.40) 
								𝜋."
I = 2(𝑤")𝐷!"                    (i, j=1,2, i≠j)                                                                          (3.41) 
							𝜋.%
I = 2(𝑤%)𝐷!%                        (i, j=1,2, i≠j)                                                                      (3.42)                                      
3.3.1 Manufacture-Stackelberg (MS) 
Under the assumption of MS, the manufacturer takes the retailer's reaction function into the 
consideration of their respective price decisions. Here, retailer reaction function, given 
wholesale price  and  can be derived from the first-order condition of equations (3.43)-
(3.44): 
                                                                                 (3.43) 
                                                                                           (3.44) 
Where i, j=1,2, i≠j. Since the objective function is concave in nature as , 
 and , it is solved by first-order condition and the value of retail margin 
and advertising effort are as follows: 
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                                                                                          (3.45)                                   




                     (i, j=1,2, i≠j)                                                                                                           (3.47) 
Solving equation (3.45)-and equation (3.47) simultaneously, the equilibrium value of m* and 









 ,        (i, j=1,2, i≠j)                                              (3.49)                          
It can be seen that the equilibrium price, advertising and demand of bundle product are linear 
functions of the wholesale price by the manufacturer. Using the reaction function (3.48-3.49), 
the manufacturers’ equilibrium wholesale price can be derived from the following first-order 
conditions of the respective manufacturers’ profit maximisation problem:  
     (i, j=1,2, i≠j)                                                                            (3.50) 
                                                               (i, j=1,2, i≠j)                         (3.51) 
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)             (3.58) 
Finally, the demand quantise for manufacturer i can be determined as: 
𝐷" = (𝛼() − 𝛽B𝑝()
∗ + 𝛾𝑝(@
∗ + 𝑘𝐴∗) 





/∗                                                                                                   (3.59) 
3.3.2 Retailer-Stackelberg (RS) 
In this model, the retailer becomes the leader and manufacturers the followers. Here, the retailer 
takes the manufacturers’ reaction function into account for its own retailer price decision. Thus, 
the retailer problem is solved given that the retailer knows the manufacturers’ reactions towards 




I(𝑤" , 𝑤%|, 𝑝!" , 𝑝!% , 𝐴)                                                                              (3.60) 
0=                                             (3.61) 
From equation (3.60), the optimal wholesale price of manufacturer i is defined as follows. 









< 0. Then, 
from the first order derivation, the optimal wholesale price of component products is obtained 
as:  
,                                                                                        (3.62) 
Likewise, we can obtain the wholesale price for manufacturer 2 is determined as follows: 
,                                                                                          (3.63) 
Using the reaction function (3.51 and 3.52), the retailer' equilibrium retail price can be derived 
from the following first-order conditions of the respective retailer's profit maximisation 
problem equations ( 3.64-3.65).  
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                                                                                  (3.64) 
                                                                                    (3.65) 
                                                                                                                       (3.66) 
                                                                                                                (3.67) 
Solving (3.66 and 3.67) results in the following retailer margin and advertising levels are as 
follows: 
,            (i, j=1,2, i≠j)                                                                              (3.68) 
                (i, j=1,2, i≠j)                (3.69) 
Solving equations (3.62, 3.63, 3.68, and 3.69), the optimal solution of , , , 











































                                                                         (3.74) 
Then we can obtain the optimal value of demand. 
𝐷" = (𝛼() − 𝛽B𝑝()
∗ + 𝛾𝑝(@
∗ + 𝑘𝐴∗) 
Where i, j=1,2, i≠j.  
Proposition 1: Under manufacturer and retailer bundling, the wholesale price increases with 
advertising elasticity in the RS power structure. 
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 Proposition 1 states that the wholesale price of bundling products increases with 
advertising elasticity under the Retailer Stackelberg structure. It is observed that the retailer 
will sell the bundling product at a higher selling price and spend more on advertising for 
generating additional demand due to the high wholesale price. Refer to Appendix A for more 
information. 
Proposition 2: Under manufacturer bundling, the retail margin of bundling products with the 
cost of advertising decreases in the MS power case, while it increases in the same proportions 
under retailer bundling.  
 Proposition 2 states that the retailer margin of bundled products increases by half when 
their proportion of advertisement costs increases under retailer bundling. The retailer sells 
bundling products with a higher selling price compared to that of the manufacturer, without 
bundling, due to their expenditure on advertising and bundling the product. Besides, the retailer 
wants to spend as much as possible on advertising costs to generate higher revenue (Hong et 
al., 2015). Refer to Appendix A for more information. 
3.3.3 Vertical Nash (VN) 
The Vertical Nash model is studied as a benchmark to both the Manufacturer Stackelberg and 
Retailer Stackelberg cases. From MS, the manufacturer reaction functions of m and A are given 
in equations (3.48) and (3.49), respectively while, in RS, the manufacturer’s reaction functions 
for 𝑤() and 𝑤() are given in equations (3.61) and (3.62) respectively. The optimal selling price, 
wholesale price and advertising level can be derived by solving all these equations 
simultaneously.   
                                                                         (3.75) 
                                                                                                    (3.76) 
                                                                         (3.77) 
 
4. Comparison of results 
The comparison of three different decision models under manufacturer bundling and retailer 
bundling are presented below. The reason for restricting the two manufacturers to having the 
same parametric values is to make the comparison of the three decision cases under two 
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bundling models, where the asymmetry between the manufacturers creates problems in making 
a comparison in the three models. A comparison between all three decision models under 
manufacturer bundling and retailer bundling models is made. 
Observation 1 - The ordinal relationship between the optimal selling price and advertising 
level under manufacturing bundling and retailer bundling are as follows: 𝑝!
/KI ≥ 𝑤!



















 From Observation 1, it is observed that the equilibrium bundling retail prices are almost 
indistinguishable between manufacturing bundling and retailer bundling under all three cases. 
However, the bundling price is higher in retailer bundling compared to manufacturer bundling 
under the RS and VN cases. Here, the manufacturer sets the lower wholesale price of 
component products and the retailer produces the bundling product from the component 
products and sells those bundled products with a higher margin in VN and RS, as compared to 
MS, to generate higher profit, thereby increasing overall profit from the bundled products. The 
equilibrium bundling advertising effort level is almost indistinguishable between 
manufacturing bundling and retailer bundling under all three MS, RS and VN cases. 
Meanwhile, the advertising effort is higher in manufacturer bundling compared to retailer 
bundling under all three MS, RS and VN cases which means that the retailer makes more of an 
effort to sell component products compared to bundle products. Thereby, the demand in 
manufacturer bundling is higher when compared to that of retailer bundling. As a result, it 
attracts more customers to purchase bundled products. The results show that firms select 
manufacturer bundling compared to retailer bundling, while considering MS, RS and VN 
strategy for their business.  
 
Observation 2 - The ordinal relationship between the optimal selling price and advertising 





















 From Observation 2, it is observed that the equilibrium bundling retail prices, wholesale 
price and advertising effort are almost indistinguishable between MS, RS, and VN under both 
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retailer bundling and manufacturer bundling strategies. Here, the manufacturer sets the lower 
wholesale price in VN and RS as compared to MS, in order to increase demand; thereby 
increasing the saving from bundled products. The retail price is mainly affected by wholesale 
price and a fraction of the collection rate. The demand in manufacturer bundling is higher, as 
compared to that of other models, because the advertising effort is higher in the VN case 
compared to other cases. As a result, it attracts more price sensitivity for the customer, when 
purchasing bundled products; furthermore, revenue attributed to the coordination can be 
effectively shared among supply chain members to increase supply, demand and profits. 
 
5. Numerical example 
In this subsection, a numerical study is conducted to illustrate the usefulness of developed 
models and test associated results. Hypothetical but relevant data are used for the numerical 
example, as obtaining real-time data on multi-attribute variables identified in the model was 
difficult. This approach is acceptable within academic research, where the possibility of 
collecting appropriate data for complex quantitative models is very difficult (e.g., Ma and 
Mallik 2016; Xu et al., 2018). Also, for the model’s simplicity and to better visualise the 
behaviour of the proposed model, a sensitivity analysis of the model is conducted. The 
following parameter values are considered for illustrating the developed models: 𝛼& =
120, , 𝛽' = 40, 𝜃 = .8, 𝛾' = 30, 𝑐! = 10, c1 = c2 = 0, 𝑘 = .6.  
Table 2: Results by different bundling case 
Parameter Manufacturer bundling Retailer bundling 
       MS   RS     VN       MS       RS       VN 
     10.94 10.81 10.86 - - - 
      p 8.89 9.05 8.86  - - 
𝑝% - - - 11.14 11.22 11.13 
     A 5.12 4.86 5.15 0.67 0.61 0.68 
  𝜋+# 32.13 26.16 29.57 2.00 1.67 2.02 
  𝜋+- 32.13 26.16 29.57 2.00 1.67 2.02 
   446.36 453.56 451.99 16.20 16.29 16.20 
   510.62 505.88 511.13 20.2 19.63 20.24 
 
 The results presented in Table 2 show that the channel profit is higher in manufacturer 
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(2017), manufacturer bundling makes a profit compared to retailer bundling under 
monopolistic situations. Although they did not consider price competition in their models, it is 
found that in manufacturer bundling, the individual component retail price is comparatively 
lower than the bundling price. Furthermore, the selling price of the bundling product in retailer 
bundling is higher compared to manufacturer bundling. However, the manufacturer makes less 
profit in retailer bundling compared to manufacturer bundling. The lower advertising effort and 
bundling cost negatively influences the manufacturer’s profit. The advertising effort cost is 
higher in manufacturer bundling compared to retailer bundling which means that the retailer 
puts more effort into advertisements for component products to sell into the market compared 
to bundled products.  As a result, the demand of component products is increased compared to 
bundling products. Our result provides similar insights to those of Yan et al. (2014), that firms 
should invest less in advertising to promote bundled products during retailer bundling 
strategies. 
 This study shows that VN provides higher profit compared to the other two RS and MS 
strategies under both bundling models. This happens as a result of lower retailing price and 
higher advertising effort. Consequently, demand for the product in VN is comparably higher 
than the MS and RS strategies. Thus, it might create an opportunity for the manufacturer and 
retailer to negotiate and delegate bundling decisions and to share profit in a supply chain 
network. Further, it is observed that the total profit in model MS is higher compared to model 
RS. This happens because of lower retail price and higher advertising effort. The equilibrium 
outcomes under retailer bundling and manufacturer bundling are different for RS models, 
whereas total profits in the MS and VN models are observed to be nearly equal for retailer and 
manufacturer bundling. Under retailer bundling, the retailer utilises limited capacity and spends 
less on advertising effort to produce more bundled products. Conversely, under manufacturer 
bundling, the manufacturer utilises limited capacity to produce less bundled products because 
bundling cost influences profit significantly when compared with component products.  
5.1.  Sensitivity analysis and managerial insights 
A sensitivity analysis was carried out to examine the impact of various parameters on the 
model.  
5.1.1. Impact of market size 
The impact of market size, 𝛼'	on the total chain profit was studied, observing that the total 
chain profit increases exponentially, as the market size increases for all three cases of bundling 
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(See Fig.1a. and Fig.1b). When market size increases, the total profit for manufacturer bundling 
increases compared to that of the retailer. This happens because the retailer sells component 
products to the market with a higher retail price and also makes higher advertisement effort in 
MB compared to RB. The demand for bundling products in VN under RB and MB increases 
as the market size increases; therefore, generating more revenue for VN compared to the other 
cases. The manufacturer profit and retailer profit in VN is higher compared to the other two 
RS and MS strategies because of equal bargaining power between retailer and manufacturer.  
Again, it is observed that the total chain profit in MS under both manufacturer bundling and 
retailer bundling cases are equal as market size increases. Furthermore, both retailer and 
manufacturer can explore the demand in RS compared to the other two models under 
manufacturer bundling because of the better service offered by them to the customers.  
 
Fig.1a.Total profit for MB with different power cases     Fig.1b.Total profit for RB with different power cases 
different values of market size (α).                                       different values of market size (α).        
                                        
                  
Fig.2a.Total profit for MB with different power cases          Fig.2b.Total profit for RB with different power cases  
different value of price elasticity (β).                                    value of price elasticity(β).         
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5.1.2. Impact of price elasticity  
The paper studied the impact of price elasticity, 𝛽' on the total chain profit for three cases 
under manufacturer and retailer bundling. The results presented in Fig. 2a and Fig. 2b show 
that the total profit decreases exponentially as the value of price elasticity increases in retail 
and manufacturer bundling. When 𝛽' increases, the VN efforts result in higher profit compared 
with that in the RS and MS cases under bundling; this is because the retail margin of the 
respective products is higher compared to the other two cases. It is also observed that the total 
profit in MS under retailer and manufacturer bundling decreases as β increases. It is marginally 
higher for VN compared to that of RS because of the low wholesale price. Furthermore, the 
cost of component products will be low, and the retailer will sell those products at a higher 
price after bundling. As a result, the demand for bundled products will decrease as β increases, 
thus leading to an increase in the total supply chain’s profit. Seldom, efficiency loss due to 
double marginalisation is limited in the MS and VN power case under retail bundling. 
Furthermore, RS bundling chooses not to serve the retailer with component products. From 
Fig.2a and Fig. 2b, it is observed that, in the VN and MS power case, the total supply chain 
profit under manufacturer bundling dominates that under retailer bundling; whenever the 
retailer offers the bundling product and advertising efforts. 
5.1.3. Impact of advertising elasticity   
Impact of advertising elasticity, k, on the total chain profit for three equilibrium cases under 
manufacturer and retailer bundling is studied. The results presented in Fig. 3a and Fig. 3b show 
that the total profit is nearly the same, as the value of advertising elasticity increases in retail 
and manufacturer bundling. When k increases, the retailer bundling generates lower profit 
compared to manufacturer bundling due to low advertising effort and high bundling margin. 
Furthermore, the retailer motivates the consumer to purchase component products due to their 
proximity to the end-customer. The retailer thinks that consumers prefer bundled products more 
as they treat them as discount products. Therefore, among these three power systems, the best 
option is to use retailer bundling, whenever the retailer offers the bundled product and uses 
appropriate advertising effort. 
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Fig.3a.Total profit for MB with different power cases     Fig.3b.Total profit for RB with different power cases 
different values of k.                                                             different values of k.        
 
6. Conclusion and contribution 
In this paper, the impact of bundling and advertisement strategy on total channel profit in a 
dual manufacturer and single retailer SC network were studied. The study developed 
mathematical models under manufacturer bundling and retailer bundling considering three 
power-balance structures. Considering bundling homogenous products, characterised 
equilibrium outcomes under each strategy showed that total profit is undifferentiated under the 
MS case and VN cases in the retailer bundling and manufacturer bundling strategies. It is also 
observed that the total chain profit under manufacturer bundling dominates retailer bundling in 
the VN and RS cases. An extension of the basic model for studying the simultaneous impact 
of advertising efforts on total channel profit under two bundling strategies was also considered.  
 The study offers understanding of different advertising strategies in practice. It is found 
that manufacturer bundling is affected more by advertising effort compared to retailer bundling. 
The retailer spends more on component products and wants to sell all the products to maximise 
the profit. When advertising effort level is constrained, the study by Yan et al. (2014) showed 
that offering bundling products could bring equilibrium under retailer bundling. Manufacturer 
bundling dominates retailer bundling (particularly in RS and VN case) in terms of the total 
supply chain profit being unique and remains valid under various scenarios of market size, 
price elasticity and advertising elasticity. These models can be limited for the service types of 
bundling as service bundling is defined as the quadratic function of service cost.  
 The paper makes an original contribution to the research interfacing supply chain and 
marketing by considering multiple parametric conditions and scenarios. To the best of authors’ 
knowledge, this is the first study to consider bundling and advertisement strategy 
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simultaneously to capture insights into price competition under different power-balance 
scenarios. Some of the key implications of this research are as follows. First, the study showed 
that the optimal outcome under manufacturer bundling in the presence of double 
marginalisation can be different from retailer bundling. Second, the study compared 
manufacturer and retailer bundling strategies in terms of total supply chain profit under various 
power structures (such as MS, RS and VN) and showed that total supply chain profit is more 
in VN and MS power-balance competition under retailer bundling and manufacturer bundling 
compared to RS cases. Third, the total supply chain profit increases as advertising expenditure 
increases under the RS and VN cases in the retailer and, subsequently, manufacturer bundling  
is established. Fourth, it is observed that in the RB case, the retailer takes no interest in spending 
a significant amount on advertising for selling the bundling products. The retailer produces the 
bundling product on the basis of customer request. Numerical examples further illustrate and 
confirm the analytical findings which, in turn, offer practical insights to firm managers. In 
addition, the findings can help manufacturers to identify the bundling price and advertising 
expenditure.   
 Taking a lead from this study, there are several potential directions for future research. 
Consideration of nonlinear price and service sensitive demand function remains unexplored in 
the literature and models discussed in this paper can be re-examined considering these 
conditions. Market demand and collection rate depend on consumer attitude, whereas 
advertisement impacts positively on consumers’ attitudes for buying bundling products; this 
insight can be useful for studying the impact of consumers’ behavioural aspects on advertising 
in the future. In this paper it was assumed that the manufacturer and retailer sell only product 
bundling to the customer. Meanwhile, retailer and manufacture sell product bundling and 
component product simultaneously with a different price to the customer. It would be 
interesting to consider both product bundling and component products simultaneously under 
perfect price and service competition. The current formulation does not present the 
characteristics of product bundles. Future research can be extended by considering these 
perspectives.  
 The products can also be bundled with various services such as core services. Thus, this 
study can be extended by considering the product-service bundling strategy under a 
competitive environment. Furthermore, future research can highlight different cost constraints 
between the direct and retail channels, while investigating the return problem of bundling. It 
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would also be interesting to understand the effect of the return policy of a bundling product on 
total supply chain profit while considering power-balance perspectives. 
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